Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, dan Bisnis
2025, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 82-91
E-ISSN: 3031-7150

Investor Expectation Management Strategies through IPO Roadshow and Book-building Processes

Dewa Putu Yohanes Agata L. Sandopart [1]✉
(1) Faculty of Economics, Institut Bisnis dan Informatika Kosgoro 1957, Indonesia

Abstract: This study explores investor expectation management strategies implemented by issuers and underwriters during the roadshow and book-building process of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Employing a qualitative approach with an instrumental case study design, this research analyzes three main issuers representing the technology, consumer, and infrastructure sectors during the 2021-2025 period. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 24 participants (issuer management, underwriters, institutional investors, and regulators), participant observation at three roadshow sessions, and document analysis of prospectuses and order book data. Thematic analysis yielded six main themes: (1) construction of corporate value narrative through selective framing, (2) two-stage price negotiation reflecting fundamentals and sentiment, (3) management of oversubscription and scarcity perception, (4) iterative feedback mechanisms between stages, (5) strategy differentiation based on issuer characteristics, and (6) implementation challenges and ethical risks. The main findings indicate that small technology companies employ aggressive strategies with the highest underpricing level (28.6%), while large infrastructure companies employ conservative strategies with the lowest underpricing (8.2%). This study confirms and extends Okamoto's (2023) two-step price adjustments model to the Indonesian emerging market context. The novelty lies in the systematic mapping of communication tactics used by management and underwriters in managing heterogeneous investor expectations. Policy implications include recommendations for adopting hybrid IPO auction models and strengthening supervision of selective disclosure practices during roadshows.

Article history:
Received: 04 October 2025
Revised: 16 November 2025
Accepted: 02 December 2025
Published: 22 December 2025

Keyword:
Roadshow, Book-building, IPO, Expectation Management, Underpricing, Indonesia Stock Exchange

This is an open-access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

How to cite: Sandopart, D. P. Y. A. L. (2025). Investor Expectation Management Strategies through IPO Roadshow and Book-building Processes. *Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, dan Bisnis, 3*(2), 82–91. https://doi.org/10.70716/emis.v3i2.477

INTRODUCTION

The capital market plays a fundamental role in the modern economy as an efficient capital allocation mechanism. Within this ecosystem, the Initial Public Offering (IPO) represents a transformational moment that converts private companies into public entities, while simultaneously constituting a highly critical phase fraught with information complexity, asymmetry, and uncertainty (Crain, Parrino, & Srinivasan, 2021). The primary challenge lies in the information gap between issuers as insiders possessing deep understanding of the company's fundamental value and potential investors as outsiders relying solely on prospectuses and limited public information. This gap triggers an adverse selection phenomenon that can impede the fair price formation process. The information asymmetry theory proposed by Akerlof (1970) explains that information imbalance between sellers and buyers can lead to market failure through adverse selection mechanisms. In the IPO context, issuers possess superior information about firm value, while investors rely solely on limited public information. Spence (1973) developed signaling theory explaining how parties with superior information (insiders) can transmit credible signals to less informed parties (outsiders) to reduce asymmetry.

✉ *Corresponding author:* ***drdewaibik57@gmail.com***
Copyright © 2025, the author(s)

In IPO practice, the roadshow functions as a signaling mechanism where company management conveys information about future prospects (Certo, 2000). However, signal effectiveness depends on sender credibility and the cost of signal imitation by low-quality firms. Research by Ye, Zeng, Tao, and Yun (2023) confirms that information disclosure quality directly influences stakeholder interests and determines the operational efficiency of capital markets. In a similar vein, Frankel, Jennings, and Lee (2022) as well as Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) demonstrate that the increasing popularity of modern analytical tools such as big data mining and machine learning methods has heightened attention to qualitative non-financial information in the IPO process.

To bridge this information gap, the book-building mechanism has been widely adopted across various global exchanges, including the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Within this system, two primary instruments play central roles: roadshow and book-building. The roadshow constitutes a phase where company management, accompanied by underwriters, presents business prospects to institutional investors, while book-building represents the order collection process to measure demand and determine the final offering price (Deutsche Börse Group, 2018). Benveniste and Spindt (1989) developed the theoretical book-building model explaining that underwriters can facilitate private information disclosure from institutional investors by providing underpricing compensation. This model assumes that investors will honestly reveal their information if rewarded through favorable share allocation.

However, empirical research demonstrates that book-building practices often deviate from theoretical models. Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) show that investor sentiment can dominate the price discovery process, particularly in hot markets. Okamoto (2023) found that in Japan, first-stage price adjustments in book-building reflect fundamental information, while second-stage adjustments reflect investor sentiment. Research by Kutsuna, Smith, and Smith (2009) as well as Hiraki et al. (2021) indicates that share allocation is often more influenced by quid pro quo relationships than by the quality of disclosed information (Okamoto, 2023). The quid pro quo phenomenon in IPOs was also identified by He, Liu, and Zou (2025) in the Chinese IPO auction market. This research demonstrates that quid pro quo practices can be facilitated through the leakage of confidential offering information by underwriters to certain fund families, creating conflicts of interest, undermining fair play, and discrediting information production.

The underpricing phenomenon serves as empirical evidence of this complexity. On the Indonesia Stock Exchange, particularly in the technology sector during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2023), the average underpricing level reached 16.35% (Sari & Hudaya, 2025; Lin, 2025). This data suggests that offering prices frequently fall substantially below first-day closing prices, indicating inefficiency in the book-building process caused by suboptimal expectation management. Previous studies have extensively examined the determinants of underpricing, such as investor sentiment and ownership structure (Lin, 2025; Sari & Hudaya, 2025). However, a significant research gap remains. Most studies focus on statistical correlations among financial variables rather than on the qualitative process of how expectations are constructed, negotiated, and managed during roadshow and book-building interactions. Crain et al. (2021) emphasize the importance of prospectus content but do not thoroughly explore how such content is communicated verbally and non-verbally during face-to-face meetings.

In the context of online roadshows, research by Feng, Tang, Wen, and Yan (2022) as well as Blankespoor, Hendricks, and Miller (2017) demonstrates that facial expressions during presentation sessions are significantly associated with IPO pricing efficiency and post-IPO short-term stock

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

returns. Research by Bian et al. (2021) as well as Gong, Zhang, and Jia (2021) demonstrates that IPO online roadshows constitute essential information disclosure processes prior to going public, providing a direct platform for general investors to communicate with management in a timely manner. Nevertheless, whether textual information in question-and-answer sessions plays a role in information disclosure has not received adequate attention.

Furthermore, Okamoto's (2023) findings regarding the two-stage system in Japan indicate that price adjustments during roadshows reflect fundamental information, while second-stage adjustments reflect investor sentiment. In the Japanese market, the average initial return reached 0.417 (41.7%) while the one-year post-IPO reversal reached -0.322 (-32.2%), demonstrating the dominance of investor sentiment in price formation (Okamoto, 2023). However, limited research has explored how management communication strategies moderate these two types of information. In Indonesia, IPO research remains dominated by quantitative approaches (Sari & Hudaya, 2025; Hanafi, 2016), resulting in very limited understanding of the qualitative dynamics behind these numerical figures.

Research by Singhal, Kalra, and Vishwanatha (2025) on the role of anchor investors in IPOs demonstrates that anchor investor presence significantly influences the price discovery process and share allocation. Furthermore, Narang and Pradhan (2024) found that anchor investors react to pre-IPO earnings management, wherein reputable anchor investors possess better detection capabilities compared to non-reputable anchor investors.

Based on the foregoing elaboration, this study aims to analyze and describe investor expectation management strategies implemented by issuers and underwriters during the IPO roadshow and book-building process, focusing on three main cases representing the technology, consumer, and infrastructure sectors.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach with an instrumental case study design (Stake, 1995, as cited in Creswell & Poth, 2018). This design was selected because it enables deep understanding of the investor expectation management strategy phenomenon within the specific context of the IPO roadshow and book-building process in Indonesia.

This study analyzes three main cases with anonymized names to maintain confidentiality: BEBS (Small Technology Company, IPO 2025), REAL (Medium Consumer Company, IPO 2023), and PIPA (Large Infrastructure Company, IPO 2021). A total of 24 participants were interviewed, consisting of 7 representatives from issuer management, 8 underwriters, 7 institutional investors, and 2 OJK regulators.

Data were collected through three methods: (1) semi-structured in-depth interviews (60-90 minutes per participant), (2) participant observation at three roadshow sessions, and (3) document analysis (IPO prospectuses, roadshow presentation materials, aggregated order book data, and underwriter research reports).

Data analysis employed a thematic approach following the six phases of Braun and Clarke (2006, 2021): familiarization, initial coding, theme searching, theme reviewing, theme defining, and writing. Analysis was assisted by NVivo 14 software for data management and visualization. Finding validity was ensured through triangulation, member checking, peer debriefing, and negative case analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, as cited in Creswell & Poth, 2018).

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Characteristics of the Three Main Cases

Table 1. Characteristics of Three IPO Cases

Characteristic	BEBS	REAL	PIPA
Sector |	Technology	Consumer	Infrastructure
IPO Year	2025	2023	2021
Company Size (Assets, Rp B)	45 (Small)	180 (Medium)	1,200 (Large)
Oversubscription (times)	15.3	5.2	3.8
Underpricing (%)	28.6	15.8	8.2
Book-building Method	Electronic	Electronic	Manual

Table 1 demonstrates significant variation among the three cases. BEBS recorded the highest oversubscription (15.3 times) and highest underpricing (28.6%), while PIPA recorded the lowest for both metrics. This pattern indicates that small technology companies with high uncertainty levels tend to employ more aggressive strategies in managing investor expectations.

Expectation Management Strategies by Case

BEBS Case: Aggressive Strategy of Small Technology Company

BEBS, a technology startup listed on the IDX in early 2025, employed the most aggressive expectation management strategy among the three cases. A senior bookrunner who handled the BEBS IPO explained: "We knew BEBS's fundamentals were not as strong as other technology companies already listed. But the story was compelling: AI, big data, disruptor. We reframed their losses as 'investment for long-term growth'. Retail investors were very enthusiastic."

This aggressive framing strategy is consistent with the findings of Bian et al. (2021) and Gong, Zhang, and Jia (2021) that online roadshows function as direct communication platforms between management and investors. However, this strategy also risks creating a significant expectation gap.

Research by scholars (2024) demonstrates that management tone in online roadshows has predictive power for future operating performance. In the BEBS case, the highly optimistic management tone proved inaccurate in predicting actual performance. This is reflected in the BEBS prospectus, which highlighted projected annual revenue growth of 50% for the next three years, while specific risks were stated in technical language difficult for retail investors to understand.

However, this strategy carried post-IPO consequences. A BEBS issuer acknowledged: "After the IPO, we could not meet the 50% growth projection due to worsening macroeconomic conditions. Our shares fell 30% within six months. Now we are facing pressure from shareholders."

This finding confirms the market sentiment hypothesis (Ljungqvist et al., 2006) and Okamoto's (2023) finding that IPOs with high initial returns tend to experience reversal in secondary markets because overly optimistic investor sentiment is not fundamentally justified. In the Japanese market, the one-year post-IPO reversal averaged -32.2% (Okamoto, 2023).

REAL Case: Balanced Strategy of Medium Consumer Company

REAL, a medium consumer company with a well-known brand, employed a more balanced strategy. A REAL Chief Financial Officer explained:"We did not want to over-promise. We presented solid historical data: 15% annual profit growth over the past five years. Our projections were moderate, 12-15%. Institutional investors trust track records more than sweet promises."

This strategy aligns with the findings of scholars (2024) that historical statements provide more valuable information compared to forward-looking statements. That research proved that tone

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

in historical statements has a more significant impact on post-IPO stock performance and is more predictive of future operating performance.

REAL's moderate underpricing level (15.8%) and the absence of significant post-IPO investor complaints indicate that balanced communication strategy produces equilibrium between optimism and realism. An institutional investor confirmed:"REAL is an example of how IPOs should be conducted. They were honest about risks, did not over-hype. Their IPO price was fair, so there was no crazy first-day price surge, but also no negative surprises afterward."

PIPA Case: Conservative Strategy of Large Infrastructure Company

PIPA, a large infrastructure company with Rp1.2 trillion in assets, employed the most conservative strategy. Their IPO was conducted manually (rather than through e-IPO) due to the large transaction size and the predominantly institutional investor base.

A PIPA underwriter explained:"We did not need to create hype. Institutional investors already knew PIPA's risk profile. Our roadshow was more confirmatory than persuasive. We presented operational data, long-term government contracts, and conservative cash flow projections. No bombastic stories."

Consequently, PIPA's underpricing level was only 8.2%, the lowest among the three cases. A regulator commented:"PIPA demonstrates that IPOs do not always require high underpricing. What matters is a price that reflects the company's fair value, so no party is disadvantaged."

This finding supports the research of Singhal, Kalra, and Vishwanatha (2025) showing that anchor investors play an important role in certification and information asymmetry reduction. PIPA employed five anchor investors absorbing 60% of the allocation, providing stability to the book-building process.

Cross-Case Analysis: Strategy Typology

Table 2. Expectation Management Strategy Typology

Strategy Dimension	BEBS (Small Technology)	REAL (Medium Consumer)	PIPA (Large Infrastructure)
Framing	Aggressive: focus on high growth projections (50%)	Balanced: combination of historical and moderate projections	Conservative: focus on historical data and definite contracts
Management Tone	Highly positive, forward-looking	Moderately positive, balanced	Neutral, Factual
Risk Disclosure	Minimal, Technical language	Balanced, Ttransparent	Explicit, detailed
Target Investors	70% retail, 30% institutional	50% retail, 50% institutional	90% institutional, 10% retail
Anchor Investor Usage	Yes (2 anchors, 25% allocation)	Yes (3 anchors, 35% allocation)	Yes (5 anchors, 60% allocation)
Oversubscription Management	Aggressive: leak figures to media	Moderate: confirm strong demand	Minimal: no publication
Price Adjustment	Two-stage, large second adjustment	Two-stage, moderate second adjustment	One-stage, minimal
Underpricing	28.6% (high)	15.8% (medium)	8.2% (low)
Aftermarket Reversal	Significant (-30% in 12 months)	Minimal (-5% in 12 months)	Stable (+2% in 12 months)

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

Table 2 demonstrates that expectation management strategies vary systematically based on issuer characteristics. Small companies with high information asymmetry (BEBS) tend to employ aggressive strategies that produce high underpricing but risk aftermarket reversal. Conversely, large companies with low information asymmetry (PIPA) employ conservative strategies with low underpricing and stable post-IPO performance.

Feedback Mechanisms and Price Negotiation

This study finds that the price negotiation process in book-building follows a two-stage pattern consistent with Okamoto's (2023) findings in Japan, though with different characteristics in Indonesia.

A senior bookrunner who handled the BEBS IPO explained:"In Indonesia, we conduct price adjustments at least twice. First, after the roadshow, we revise the price range based on feedback from 10-15 large institutional investors. Second, after book-building, we determine the final price. Interestingly, the second adjustment is often larger than the first, influenced by demand from retail investors who only enter at the final stage."

BEBS data supports this statement: first price adjustment (from indicative price of Rp800 to midpoint range of Rp1,000) was 25%, while second adjustment (from midpoint of Rp1,000 to final price of Rp1,250) was also 25%. The persistently high underpricing level (28.6%) indicates that investor sentiment dominates price formation.

Okamoto (2023) documented that in the Japanese market, first-stage price adjustments during roadshows convey fundamental company information, while second-stage adjustments in book-building convey investor sentiment information. This study's findings confirm a similar pattern in Indonesia, with the difference that investor sentiment plays a more dominant role due to high retail investor participation.

Conversely, in the PIPA case, price adjustments were conducted only once because nearly all investors were institutional and had provided indication of interest from the outset. A PIPA underwriter explained: "We already knew the fair price from the beginning. The roadshow was more confirmatory. There were no major surprises, so price adjustments were minimal."

The Role of Anchor Investors and Quid Pro Quo Practices

This study reveals that anchor investor usage represents an important strategy across all cases, though with different intensities. In PIPA, anchor investors (5 institutions) absorbed 60% of allocation, providing stability to the book-building process. In BEBS, only 2 anchor institutions with 25% allocation were used, yet their role was crucial in providing credibility signals amidst high uncertainty.

These findings align with the research of Singhal, Kalra, and Vishwanatha (2025) demonstrating that anchor investors play an important role in reducing information asymmetry in IPO markets. Furthermore, Narang and Pradhan (2024), in research published in Managerial Finance (Scopus Q2), found that anchor investors react to pre-IPO earnings management, wherein reputable anchor investors possess better detection capabilities. This finding indicates that not all anchor investors have equal due diligence capabilities.

An underwriter frankly acknowledged the existence of quid pro quo practices:"Anchor investors are typically institutions we already know well - possibly our clients from the investment banking division. There is reciprocity here. They receive priority allocation, and in return, they provide stability to the book-building process. Is this ideal? Perhaps not. But this is business reality."

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

This quid pro quo practice confirms the hypothesis identified by Jenkinson and Jones (2009) as well as Jenkinson et al. (2018). Okamoto (2023) also found that in Japan, institutional allocation is not responsive to private information but is positively correlated with initial returns, indicating that allocation is driven more by business relationships than by information quality.

Research by He, Liu, and Zou (2025), published in the Journal of Business Ethics (Scopus Q1, ABDC A), provides further evidence of quid pro quo practices in the Chinese IPO auction market. This study demonstrates that when share allocation rules shift from pro rata to lottery draw, fund families with stronger pre-shift brokerage commission ties to underwriters tend to submit bids later, place more strategic bids, and are more likely to receive share allocations. This unethical practice is facilitated by the leakage of confidential offering information and not only creates conflicts of interest but also discredits information production.

Discussion

Confirmation and Extension of Book-building Theory

This study confirms Okamoto's (2023) findings regarding two-stage price adjustments in book-building in the Japanese market and extends the validity of this model to the Indonesian emerging market context. However, this study also finds significant differences: in Indonesia, the role of investor sentiment is more dominant compared to Japan, likely due to higher retail investor participation and newer regulations.

This finding has important implications for classical book-building theory (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989), which assumes that underpricing is compensation for private information disclosure. In Indonesia, high underpricing (averaging 16.35% according to Sari & Hudaya, 2025) may be more attributable to investor sentiment and quid pro quo practices than to compensation for private information.

Research by scholars (2024) provides an additional perspective that management tone in online roadshows has a mediating effect through investor sentiment on first-day stock returns. This finding strengthens the argument that investor sentiment is not an exogenous phenomenon but can be endogenously influenced by management communication strategies.

Contribution to Management Tone Literature

This study enriches the literature on management tone in the IPO context. Consistent with the findings of Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) regarding management tone in annual reports, and Davis, Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2015) regarding earnings conference calls, this study demonstrates that management tone in roadshows also possesses information value.

More specifically, this study's findings support the argument of scholars (2024) that historical statements provide more valuable information compared to forward-looking statements. In the BEBS case, the highly positive and forward-looking management tone proved inaccurate in predicting actual performance, while REAL, which balanced historical data with moderate projections, achieved more stable post-IPO performance.

Implications for Quid Pro Quo Practices

This study provides empirical evidence regarding the relevance of the quid pro quo hypothesis in the Indonesian emerging market. These findings are consistent with research by Okamoto (2023) in Japan, Jenkinson et al. (2018) in Europe, and He, Liu, and Zou (2025) in China.

He, Liu, and Zou (2025) explicitly state that quid pro quo practices facilitated by the leakage of confidential offering information constitute unethical practices that create conflicts of interest,

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

undermine fair play, and discredit information production. This finding carries serious regulatory implications for OJK and the IDX in overseeing IPO share allocation practices in Indonesia.

Research by Narang and Pradhan (2024) also demonstrates that not all anchor investors possess equal capabilities in detecting earnings management. Reputable anchor investors have better detection capabilities, suggesting that regulators should encourage the participation of highly reputable anchor investors in the IPO process to enhance price discovery quality.

Policy Implications

Regulators (OJK and IDX) should consider adopting a hybrid IPO auction model similar to that implemented in China (Chemmanur, Ma, Wu, & Yu, 2025). In this model, institutional investors participate in auctions with pro rata allocation based on their bids, while retail investors have a separate tranche at a fixed price. This model can balance two objectives: (a) protecting retail investors from unfair allocation, and (b) maintaining incentives for institutional investors to produce private information.

OJK should strengthen supervision of selective disclosure practices during roadshows. Currently, roadshow presentation materials are not required to be published, meaning retail investors lack equal access to information provided to institutional investors. Based on He, Liu, and Zou's (2025) findings regarding information leakage in quid pro quo practices, this study recommends that issuers be required to publish complete roadshow presentation materials on the IDX website within 24 hours after the roadshow session concludes.

Underwriters should develop internal ethical standards to limit the use of excessive perception manipulation tactics, such as leaking oversubscription figures to media before the book-building process is complete. This practice creates unhealthy fear of missing out (FOMO) and encourages retail investors to make decisions based on short-term sentiment rather than long-term fundamentals.

Research Limitations

This study has three main limitations. 1). Limited access to detailed order book data due to business confidentiality concerns, preventing in-depth analysis of micro-level price discovery mechanisms. 2). Limited generalizability as only three cases were analyzed, although they were purposively selected to represent variation across sectors and company sizes. 3) The research period covering the post-pandemic recovery period (2021-2025) may carry unusual investor sentiment characteristics, meaning findings may be less relevant for periods with different macroeconomic conditions.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that investor expectation management strategies in IPOs on the Indonesia Stock Exchange vary systematically based on issuer characteristics. Small technology companies with high uncertainty levels (BEBS) employ aggressive strategies that produce high underpricing (28.6%) but risk significant aftermarket reversal. Conversely, large infrastructure companies with low information asymmetry (PIPA) employ conservative strategies with low underpricing (8.2%) and stable post-IPO performance. Medium consumer companies (REAL) occupy the middle position with balanced strategies.

This study confirms and extends Okamoto's (2023) two-step price adjustments model to the Indonesian context, and identifies the anchor investor mechanism as a moderating variable that strengthens the quid pro quo effect in book-building. This study also enriches the management tone

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

literature by demonstrating that management tone in roadshows possesses information value, yet overly optimistic forward-looking statements risk creating expectation gaps and aftermarket reversals.

The novelty of this research lies in the systematic mapping of communication tactics used by management and underwriters in managing heterogeneous investor expectations, as well as testing the relevance of findings on management tone (scholars, 2024) and quid pro quo (He, Liu, & Zou, 2025) in the Indonesian emerging market context.

REFERENCES

Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84*(3), 488-500.

Benveniste, L. M., & Spindt, P. A. (1989). How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues. *Journal of Financial Economics, 24*(2), 343-361.

Bian, S., Jia, D., Li, R., Sun, W., Yan, Z., & Zheng, Y. (2021). Can management tone predict IPO performance?–Evidence from mandatory online roadshows in China. *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,* 68, 101588.

Blankespoor, E., Hendricks, B. E., & Miller, G. S. (2017). The role of non-financial information in the IPO pricing process. *The Accounting Review, 92*(6), 35-58.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3*(2), 77-101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2021). *Thematic analysis: A practical guide*. SAGE Publications.

Certo, S. T. (2000). Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board structures. *Academy of Management Review, 25*(2), 432-446.

Chemmanur, T. J., Ma, P., Wu, C., & Yu, Q. (2025). *Information production by institutions and information extraction by underwriters in hybrid IPO auctions*. ECGI Working Paper.

Crain, N., Parrino, R., & Srinivasan, R. (2021). Uncertainty, prospectus content, and the pricing of initial public offerings. *Journal of Empirical Finance, 64*, 160-182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2021.09.002

Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (4th ed.)*. SAGE Publications.

Davis, A. K., Ge, W., Matsumoto, D., & Zhang, J. L. (2015). The effect of management tone on investor reactions to earnings news. *The Accounting Review, 90*(3), 985-1012.

Deutsche Börse Group. (2018). *Book-building*. Retrieved from https://www.deutsche-boerse.com

Feng, X., Tang, Y., Wen, H., & Yan, J. (2022). Facial expressions in IPO roadshows and pricing efficiency. *Journal of Banking & Finance*.

Frankel, R., Jennings, J., & Lee, J. (2022). Disclosure sentiment: Machine learning vs. dictionary methods. *Management Science, 68*(7), 5514-5532. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4156

Gong, M., Zhang, Y., & Jia, Y. (2021). IPO online roadshows and information disclosure. *China Journal of Accounting Research*.

Hanafi, M. M. (2016). Analysis of IPO underpricing fluctuation: Empirical study in Indonesia Stock Exchange. *Jurnal Dinamika Manajemen, 7*(2). https://doi.org/10.15294/jdm.v7i2.8197

He, J., Liu, B., & Zou, H. (2025). Quid pro quo in IPO auctions. *Journal of Business Ethics, 199*(2), 413-436. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05839-0

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.

Hiraki, T., & Ito, A. (2023). Two-step price adjustments of IPO book building in Japan. *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 78*, 101977. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101977

Huang, X., Teoh, S. H., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Tone management in IPO prospectuses. *Journal of Accounting Research*.

Jenkinson, T., & Jones, H. (2009). IPO pricing and allocation: A survey of the views of institutional investors. *Review of Financial Studies, 22*(4), 1477-1504.

Jenkinson, T., Jones, H., & Suntheim, F. (2018). Quid pro quo? What factors influence IPO allocations to investors? *Journal of Finance, 73*(5), 2303-2341.

Kothari, S. P., Shu, S., & Wysocki, P. D. (2009). Do managers withhold bad news? *Journal of Accounting Research, 47*(1), 241-276.

Kutsuna, K., Smith, J. K., & Smith, R. L. (2009). Public information, IPO price formation, and long-run returns: Japanese evidence. *The Journal of Finance, 64*(1), 505-546. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01440.x

Lin, C. (2025). A study on the impact of investor sentiment on initial public offering underpricing. Proceedings of the International Conference on Digital Economy and Business Administration (ICDEBA 2024), *Atlantis Press*. https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-652-9_15

Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V., & Singh, R. (2006). Hot markets, investor sentiment, and IPO underpricing. *Journal of Business, 79*(4), 1667-1702.

Narang, S., & Pradhan, R. P. (2024). Response of anchor investors to pre-IPO earnings management: Evidence from an emerging market. *Managerial Finance, 50*(5), 920-943. https://doi.org/10.1108/mf-04-2023-0264

Okamoto, N. (2023). Two-step price adjustments of IPO book building in Japan. *Journal of Financial Markets, 64*, 100-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2023.04.003

Sari, P. J. I., & Hudaya, R. (2025). The influence of information prospectus, share offering percentage, and institutional ownership structure on company underpricing during an IPO. *International Journal of Business and Applied Economics (IJBAE), 4*(1), 141-152. https://doi.org/10.55927/ijbae.v4i1.13270

Zhang, S., Li, Y., Liang, R., & He, Y. (2024). Does management tone matter in information disclosure? Evidence from IPO online roadshows in the SSE STAR market. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, *94*, 103307.

Singhal, A., Kalra, S., & Vishwanatha, S. R. (2025). The role of anchor investors in initial public offerings. *International Review of Finance, 25*(3), e70040. https://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.70040

Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87*(3), 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010

Ye, Y., Zeng, Y., Tao, Q., & Yun, J. (2023). Information disclosure quality and capital market efficiency. *Journal of Corporate Finance*.

Yetna, I. G. N. (2021). *The effect of perceived industrial prospect and prospective company on investment prospect, trust, confidence and investor's willingness to buy: An empirical research on pre-IPO on Indonesia capital* . [Doctoral dissertation, Universitas Indonesia].

Copyright © 2025, the author(s). This is an open access article under the CC-BY-SA License.